The Italian military in World War Two (1939-1945) has often been described as having been cowardly by Allied veterans who fought against them, as too willing to surrender or flee from battle. What is usually not known outside of Italy is why the Italians put up such a half hearted effort. The reasons for Italian half heartedness during the Second World War are mainly historical and political in nature. The Italians since the Middle Ages have had a tradition of hostility and rivalry with the Germans, especially with the Austrian Germans, who share a border with Italy. During the Middle Ages the Holy Roman Emperors, who were usually ethnic Germans, included the disunited Italian city states within their realm, and the latter were divided in their loyalty to either the emperor or the pope. The emperors and the popes were often at loggerheads. When the Austrian Habsburgs became Holy Roman Emperors in the 1500's, Italy, along with principalities in southern and western Germany, eastern France, the Netherlands, and the Spanish Empire fell into their possessions. The Spanish branch of the Habsburg dynasty was replaced by the French Bourbons in 1700, and southern Italy fell into the hands of the Spanish Bourbons while northern Italy remained in the possession of the Austrian Habsburgs. Central Italy was ruled by the popes. In the Italian wars of reunification and independence fought from 1859-1870, the Italians on occasions showed remarkable bravery and motivation, especially under the red shirt volunteers of Giuseppe Garibaldi. During these wars, the British, the French under Napoleon III, and the Prussian Germans under Kaiser Wilhelm I, intervened on the side of Italy. In the years after 1870 however the German Hohenzollerns and Austro-Hungarian Habsburgs drew closer together, and fought as allies in World War one. Adolf Hitler in his autobiography and political manifesto known as Mein Kampf (My Struggle) said that one of the reasons why Italy entered the First World War (1914-1918) on the side of France, Great Britain, and Russia in 1915 was because of its old hatred of their former Austrian Habsburg rulers, for he had often heard from the Italians while living in the Austrian capital of Vienna their grudges against the past Austrian imperial rule of northern Italy (1). Nevertheless, the Italians entered the First World War "more in the spirit of a bargain than a crusade" for independence, for the Allies had promised them imperial Habsburg territory in Slovenia and the Croatian lands in Dalmatia, lands which had once been ruled by the Venetian Empire, the former Queen of the Adriatic Sea, and of course once by the Roman Empire (2). The only Italian territory occupied by the Austrians in 1915 was the South Tyrol, which had a large German speaking minority. After the First World War ended in 1918, the South Tyrol and the Istrian peninsula, now a part of Croatia, came under Italian rule, along with several Croatian islands in the Adriatic Sea and the city of Zadar. On the whole, the Italians were dissatisfied with their gains, believing that all of Dalmatia from Istria to Albania should have been awarded to Italy (3).
Benito Mussolini at first was wary of Adolf Hitler, believing that his plans for expansion in the Balkans threatened his own ambitions. When Hitler made plans in 1934 to seize German speaking Austria, Mussolini moved Italian army divisions up to the Brenner pass on the Italian-Austrian border to deter the Germans (4). It was not until 1938 that Hitler felt that Germany was strong enough militarily to annex Austria, and this annexation was looked upon by ordinary Italians with deep dread. When Italy entered the Second World War on the side of Germany in 1940, most Italians felt that their country had become a German satellite. During the worldwide economic Great Depression of the 1930's, Italy coped poorly with mass unemployment, which meant that most Italians had become disenchanted with Mussolini's Fascist regime (5). Nazi Germany, another fascist regime, on the other hand, underwent something of an economic miracle, where unemployment rapidly fell from the great heights it had reached in Weimar Germany before the Nazis came to power in 1933 (6). When the Fascists came to power in Italy in 1922, they did so with the help of an anti-communist coalition which was alarmed at the electoral strength of the Communists and Socialists in Italy, and the Nazis in Germany came to power in the same way and for the same reasons. Both fascist regimes declared their parties the only legal party soon afterwards, backed by the tacit agreement of their military. The Communists had come to power in Russia in 1917 and many Europeans were fearful of its spread, especially when the Great Depression was at its height. Both Italy and Germany in 1918 were young, inexperienced democracies, with universal adult suffrage or voting rights having been only recently introduced (7). The Italian national elections of April 1924 were run under the Acerbo Election Law, which awarded 66% of the seats in the lower house of the Italian parliament to the party that received the largest number of votes (provided it was over 25%) and then distributed the rest among the other parties by proportional representation (8). This election, like the German federal election of March 1933, was held against a background of widespread violence, intimidation and vote rigging (9). Throughout the Second World War the Italians had military equipment which was technologically out-of-date, some of it of World War One vintage, or lacking in firepower and adequate protection (10). The level of industrialization in Italy before 1945 lagged seriously behind when compared with that of Germany, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent France (11). The Italian army, navy, and air force only cooperated with each other to a limited extent, and many of Mussolini's senior military officers were appointed more for their loyalty than competence (12). Italy's underdeveloped economy saw a restricting limit imposed on the amount of money which could be spent for the training of military personnel (13). Throughout the Second World War the Italian military to a greater extent than even that of Germany suffered from chronic petroleum shortages, severely restricting it's ability to wage a mobile war (14). The Germans obtained their petroleum supplies by making it artificially from their coal reserves, and later on from Romania after they occupied that country in 1940. After the Germans, Italians, and Japanese signed the Anti-Comintern (Communist International) Pact in 1936, and after the Germans occupied Austria in March 1938, the Italians began to make their petroleum artificially from German coal transported to Italy by railway via Austria. Oil extraction from coal and oil shale rock is an expensive process. See Military History of Italy During World War II; Royal Italian Army During World War II (Regio Esercito); Royal Italian Air Force (Regio Aeronautica Italiana); Royal Italian Navy (Regia Marina).
Mussolini had tried to shift attention away from Italy's economic problems during the Great Depression by launching an invasion of Ethiopia, then known as Abyssinia, in 1935, which was successfully completed in 1936 (15). By 1936, Italy's African colonial possessions in addition to Ethiopia included Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya. The Italians had tried unsuccessfully in 1896 to annex Ethiopia but were defeated at the Battle of Adowa by a much more numerous Ethiopian army armed with machine guns, rifles, and cannons purchased from the French, British, and Germans (16). The Italian empire in Europe reached its greatest extent in 1941 when it came to include much of Slovenia, all of Dalmatia (i.e. part of Slovenia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro), Albania, Kosovo, and most of Greece, which had been given to them by the Germans after their invasion of the Balkans in 1941. The Italians also held British Somaliland from 1940-1941, and the French colony of Tunisia from November 1942 - May 1943, after the Germans occupied the collaborationist Vichy French zone in southern France. For a while from around late 1940 to early 1941 the Italians occupied a part of the western desert of Egypt, which at the time was a British protectorate. Since 1901 the Italians had a concession, enclave or treaty port in the Chinese city of Tientsin or Tianjin, which was taken over by the Chinese Wang Jing Wei's pro-Japanese collaborationist government in 1943 after Italy switched sides from the Axis powers to the Allies. The Italians had annexed Albania in 1939, from which they had launched an unsuccessful invasion of Greece in 1940. The reason for the Italian defeat in Greece was because of the mountainous terrain of the country, made worse by the rainy weather at the time, which turned mountain tracks into bogs and therefore made it unsuitable for the use of tanks, while the overcast skies at the same time hindered the use of the Italian air force (17). In 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of Germany during the latter stages of the Battle of France, and was awarded some border territories by Germany in the French province of Savoy. When the Germans occupied the puppet Vichy state of southern France on November 11 1942, Corsica, occupied by France since 1768 after having been previously part of the Italian city state of Genoa, was returned to Italy, and Italy's territorial acquisitions in the French provinces of Savoy and Provence dating from 1940 were also enlarged by the Germans after November 11 1942. From late 1940 until early 1941 the Italians occupied several villages in the British colonies of the Sudan and Kenya which lay near the border of Italian East Africa. After the British liberated Ethiopia in 1941, the Italians, Eritrean, Somali, and certain Ethiopian tribes friendly to Fascist Italy, fought a guerrilla war against the British in Ethiopia until October 13 1943, the day that Italy declared war against their former German partner and joined the Allies.
Mussolini had drifted towards friendlier relations with Hitler's Germany as a result of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), when both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had sent military forces to fight on behalf of Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces against the Republican government, the latter of whom received help from Stalinist Russia (18). The Italians usually won the battles in which they participated in during the Spanish Civil War, although their defeat at the Battle of Guadalajara in 1936 was the notable exception. In 1936 Germany, Italy, and Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern (Communist International) Pact, followed by the Axis Tripartite Pact of 1940. Most ordinary Italians however resented allying with their old rival Germany. I remember once reading on an internet website concerning alleged Italian cowardice during World War Two the words of one Italian veteran who said that his countrymen were wise enough to see that their alliance with Germany was a lost cause, for in the end, should Germany win the war, they would dominate Europe and their allied satellites of Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Milan Nedic's Chetnik Serbia in the Balkans, and that is why the Italians fought reluctantly against their former World War One allies, i.e. the British and Gaullist Free French (Italians in World War II, by Justin Demetri). When the Americans, British, and Free French invaded Italy in 1943, the Italians switched sides, and the Germans rushed troops into Italy. The Italians rose up against their old German rivals in the Partisan resistance movement and the pro-Allied, Royal Co-Belligerent Army, Navy and Air Force, showing their true feelings towards them. The pro-German, collaborationist, fascist Italian Social Republic of northern Italy had the National Republican Army which fought alongside the Germans in the Italian Civil War which lasted from September 8, 1943 to May 2, 1945. The Italian Partisans included such wide ranging groups as communists, anarchists, socialists, centrists, and moderate center-right, as was also the case with the World War Two French resistance movement known as the Maquis. The mountainous Italian peninsula proved to be a tough battleground for the Allies, and it was not until the war ended in Europe in May 1945 that they succeeded in reaching the Austrian-Italian border. From 1943 to 1945 the South Tyrol province of Italy was reannexed to the German Third Reich (1933-1945).
The Italians in the days of Republican Rome and the early years of the Roman Empire formed the majority of the soldiers in the legions, although by the latter part of the Empire most of its legionnaries were the conquered Roman provincials and the barbarians living outside the imperial borders. One of the reasons why the western provinces of the Roman Empire fell to Germanic barbarian invaders, as opposed to the eastern or Byzantine provinces of the Roman Empire, was because the western half was in a disunited state, embroiled in civil wars from 383-388, 392-394, 397-398, 407-413, 409-417 (Bagaudae peasant revolt in Gaul, i.e. Roman France), 421, 423-425, 427, 432, 435-437 (the Gaulish Bagaudae peasant revolt), 454-457, 463-465 and 468-472 A.D. During times of civil war, the level of training, drill, and discipline in the Roman military suffered, and experienced veterans killed in battle were replaced either by inexperienced conscripts or untrustworthy barbarians. The wages of the later generations of Roman soldiers was worth less in real value than that paid to earlier generations. The Mongolian Huns, who fought on horseback with a long range bow against both the Romans and Germans, proved to be quite effective in their tactics as horse archers, although horse archers were vulnerable to mounted infantry or foot archers armed with crossbows or longbows and protected by anti-cavalry wooden stakes driven into the ground (Mounted Archery). The historian Adrian Goldsworthy blamed Rome's recurring civil wars for contributing to it's weakened ability to repel foreign invasions in his book The Fall of the West: The Slow Death of the Roman Superpower (First published in Great Britain in 2009 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, paperback edition published in 2010 by Phoenix, an imprint of Orion Books Ltd, London. Published in the U.S.A. as How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower, and Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, Thames & Hudson Ltd, London, 2003, first paperback edition 2011). The historian Roger Collins came to the same conclusion in his book Early Medieval Europe: 300-1000 (The Macmillan Press Ltd, London, The United Kingdom, 1991). The Byzantine or East Roman Empire had the added advantage of having strong fortifications around the capital of Constantinople (formerly Byzantium, now Istanbul), located at a strategic point that controlled the north to south sea lanes connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, and the east to west near land routes linking the Balkans with Anatolia (Turkey). The Romans controlled German territory from the Rhine to the Elbe rivers from 12 B.C. to 9 A.D., until the Roman general Varus was defeated in an ambush in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest at the hands of a Germanic tribal coalition led by the chieftain Arminius (Battle of the Teutoburg Forest). The Romans avenged this defeat by their victories against Arminius' coalition at the Battles of Idistaviso or the Weser River and the Angivarian Wall in 16 A.D., led by the Roman general Germanicus Caesar (Battle of the Weser River; Angrivarii). However, Germanicus was ordered to withdraw the Roman troops in the province of Germania to the Rhine and Danube rivers in 17 A.D. by the Emperor Tiberius. The Rhine was a much more more practical boundary for the Roman Empire than any other river in Germania because logistically Roman armies on the Rhine could be supplied from the Mediterranean Sea via the Rhône, Saône, and Moselle (Mosel) rivers, with a brief stretch of portage. Armies on the Elbe river, on the other hand, would have to have been supplied either by extensive overland routes or ships travelling the hazardous Atlantic seas. Economically, the Rhine was already supporting towns and sizeable villages at the time of the Gallic (Roman French) conquest. Northern Germania, however, was far less developed, possessed fewer villages, and had little food surplus. Thus the Rhine was both significantly more accessible from Rome and better equipped to supply sizeable garrisons than the regions beyond. This analysis on why the Romans did not try to expand their boundaries in Germania was set forth by the historian Peter Heather in his book The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians (2006). In addition Roman senatorial aristocrats and emperors often distrusted their generals who won great victories over foreign and internal enemies since they could use their popularity with the Roman army to overthrow them. See Arian Goldswothy, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire, first published in Great Britain in 2003 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, paperback edition published in 2004 by Phoenix, an imprint of Orion Books Ltd, London, and Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: The Life of a Colossus, first published in Great Britain in 2006 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, paperback edition published in 2007 by Phoenix, an imprint of Orion Books Ltd, London. Sometimes the Romans launched punitive military expeditions east of the Rhine and north of the Danube rivers into unoccupied German territory. One of them reached as far deep into Germany as the Harzhorn Hill, located in the German state of Lower Saxony, east of the Weser River, between the towns of Kalefeld and Bad Gandersheim, where the Romans won a victory over Germanic tribes at the Battle of the Harzhorn in 235 A.D. Archaeological remains of the battle were first discovered in December 2008, and excavation of the site has continued since then. The battle was fought during either the reigns of the Roman Emperors Severus Alexander or Maximinus Thrax (Battle at the Harzhorn). As the Roman Empire expanded outside of the Italian peninsula, more and more of its soldiers and sailors came to be recruited from the provinces, and after the frontiers stabilized, many persons living outside the Roman imperial borders joined the Roman military.
Similar to the image of alleged Italian cowardice in World War Two, the French have also been castigated for their defeat in six weeks by Germany during the Battle of France in 1940. The German method of warfare during World War Two, known as Blitzkrieg or Lightning War, was a war of rapid movement based on self-contained tank divisions covered by close air support (19). The French and British on the other hand thought that the war would be a static one based on attrition, as had been the case in the trench warfare of World War One (20). The Blitzkrieg in 1941 and 1942 had seen the capture of vast amounts of territory in the European part of Russia, which was only halted by the sheer geographical size and population of the Soviet Union, as well as by its bitterly cold winters, the same factors which had been the undoing of the Napoleonic invasion of 1812. Joseph Stalin in the 1930's had executed or imprisoned many of the top Red Army officers, for he feared that they might have tried to remove him from power, and had replaced them with incompetent and inexperienced officers whose loyalty he could be assured of (21). Nevertheless, the brutality of the Germans towards the people of the Soviet Union, whom they regarded as Slavic sub-humans, meant that the Nazis soon lost their initial support from the Soviets, many of whom at the beginning welcomed them as liberators from the harsh Communist regime (22). This latter factor in hardening Soviet resistance, and the vast industrial potential of Russia located safely out of Nazi reach east of the Ural mountain ranges which separates European from Asian Russia, meant that Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union was ultimately doomed to failure. In sharp contrast to the situation in Russia during World War Two, Russia during World War One had a shortage of everything except manpower, for at that stage of its history it was still a largely underindustrialized country (23). Russia's military and economic disasters during World War One largely contributed to the two revolutions of 1917 and its surrender to Germany in early 1918. Stalin during the 1930's had forced a program of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture for the Soviet Union, which had resulted in a sharp decline in agricultural output and millions of deaths in a famine (24). The inefficient communist system, which ignored the free enterprise laws of supply and demand, meant that the Soviet Union until its demise in 1991 was seldom if ever self-sufficient in food production, and was dependent on imported wheat from such countries as The United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia (25). The Communist system, because it ignored the free market laws of supply and demand, meant that Soviet industry regularly produced shortages and surpluses. The shortages led to inflation in real terms via a black market, and the surpluses led to Soviet factories running at a loss and having to be ultimately subsidized by taxpayers (26).
"In March 1941 the Russian military asked Stalin to agree to the call-up of reserves for re-training. Stalin refused on the grounds that it might have provided the Germans with an excuse for provoking war. At this time German reconnaissance planes made daily flights over Soviet territory and provided the Germans with detailed pictures of the Russian defences. Stalin issued strict orders that the planes were not to be fired on. When the Soviet commander at Kiev ordered some of his troops to occupy sections of the frontier fortifications which had not yet been completed, he received the order from Moscow that his actions might provoke the Germans to attack, and was ordered to reverse his decision immediately" (27). "Stalin regarded the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 as a time-gaining stop-gap, but the time-span proved much shorter than he anticipated. His chief mistake was in overestimating the period he had available for preparation, and he was genuinely surprised when the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. On June 6, 1941 Stalin approved a plan for the shift-over of Soviet industry to war production; this timetable called for the completion of the plan by the end of 1942" (28). "In the period 1939-1941, Russian industry was not put on to a war footing: many types of new weapons, tanks, and aircraft, which had already been tested and were superior to their German equivalents, were not put into production; some proven weapons, such as the 44-mm. anti-tank gun, were actually withdrawn from service; the reorganisation of armoured units was not carried through; troop training was still on a peacetime basis" (29).The much smaller nations of Poland and France had very little chance of surviving the German Blitzkrieg method of warfare, while the United Kingdom was relatively safe behind the English Channel and the North Sea, protected by its powerful navy, air force, and radar stations. During the 1940 Battle of Britain the British air force could retire to northern and western Britain safely out of the range of German fighter planes, the latter of whom could only stay in the air for 90 minutes because of fuel constraints (30). Nonetheless, the German air force came close to gaining air superiority over southeastern England at one stage before Hitler decided to switch the bombing from the airfields to the cities of England, thus allowing the British air force time to recover (31). Moreover, the German fighter planes were often tied up in escorting their bombers, the latter of which were slow, lightly armoured and lightly armed targets for the British fighter planes (32).
In the 1940 Battle of France both the French and British made the mistake of pennypacketing their tanks, i.e. dividing them up among their infantry divisions, thus reducing their speed to the marching pace of their infantry. The Germans on the other hand separated their tanks from their infantry divisions and organized them into motorised divisions called panzers which could rapidly overrun enemy territory (33). The French and British based their tank warfare on the tactics and strategy which, along with the arrival of the Americans in 1917, had helped them to win in The First World War (34). The Germans had ten panzer or tank divisions in the Battle of France, while the French and British had a total of five, and these were spread out in line defence in accordance with World War One tactics rather than massed for attack as were the German ones (35). Another factor in the German victory over France in 1940 was the shortage of French and British fighter and bomber aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and communications, the latter of which favoured the German tanks equipped with two-way, mobile and wireless radio telephones (36). The German tanks with their radios could call in an air strike by Stuka dive bombers in support of their ground forces as needed. Only a few French tanks were equipped with radios, and many of them were unreliable (37). The newer German Panzers had a crew of five men; a commander, gunner-aimer, loader, driver and mechanic. Having a trained individual for each tank allowed each man to dedicate himself to his own mission and it made for a highly efficient team. The French had fewer members, with the commander double-tasked with loading the main gun, distracting him from his main duties in observation and tactical deployment. It made for a far less efficient system (38). Between the world wars the French had invested in the Maginot Line underground fortifications along the French-German border, and these bunkers were never taken in a direct assault by the Germans. Unfortunately, the French had left their border with Luxembourg and Belgium undefended, and it was through these countries, along with The Netherlands, that the German attack had come. Charles de Gaulle as an army colonel had tried in vain during the 1930's to convince the French High Command to adopt the new tank and air warfare blitzkrieg tactics of Nazi Germany (39).
The French during World War One had put up a much stiffer resistance, although their population and level of industrialization was much smaller than that of Germany (40). The only time that discipline and morale in the French army broke down temporarily during The First World War was during the Nivelle Offensive of 16 April to 9 May 1917, also known as the Second Battle of the Aisne or the Third Battle of the Champagne. French general Robert Nivelle had replaced general Joseph Joffre as commander in chief of French forces in December 1916. "Nivelle planned a major offensive near the Aisne River and predicted he would smash through the German line within two days" (41). Germany's pullback to the Siegfried Line did not shake Nivelle's confidence. Nivelle's plans for the offensive were leaked to the Germans, who responded by moving back to a strongly fortified new battle line in northern France, called the Siegfried Line by the Germans and the Hindenburg Line by the Allies (41). "The Siegfried Line shortened the Western Front and placed German artillery and machine guns to best advantage" (42). The Germans were entrenched on the Chemin des Dames ridge, which is high ground overlooking the valley of the Aisne River. It is 80 kilometres long and runs along a ridge between the valleys of the rivers Aisne and Ailette. The Germans had created a network of deep shelters in old underground stone quarries below the ridge, leaving them protected from any Allied artillery barrage (43). The German positions dominated the southerly slope over which the French assault came (Chemin des Dames). The German entrenchments had anti-tank artillery and the new portable MG 08/15 machine guns, one hundred of them for every kilometre of front, well entrenched in deep positions (44). On the day that the French assault began, heavy rains turned the no man's land into muddy quagmires, which slowed the advance of the French tanks and made them easy targets for the German anti-tank artillery situated on top of the ridge (Chemin des Dames). The high casualties sustained by the French attackers and the minimal gains in territory to show for it led to a mutiny in the French army, where the soldiers pledged to defend against any attack but refused to launch any offensive until new tactics were devised to break the stalemate of trench warfare (45). Later in the year, the French succeeded in capturing from the Germans the town of La Malmaison and control of the Chemin des Dames ridge on 24 October 1917 in the Battle of La Malmaison (Second Battle of the Aisne). Nivelle was replaced as commander-in-chief by Henri Pétain, who had successfully withstood a German assault at high cost to both attackers and defenders on the fortified town of Verdun in 1916 (46). Pétain was to later on form a collaborationist German puppet regime known as Vichy France during the Second World War, for he detested the French government of the late 1930's which he believed was too dominated by the socialists and communists. In spite of their anti-communism, many of the French fascists secretly detested the Nazi Germans at the same time, and some of them joined up with the French partisan resistance known as the Maquis and the regular Free French forces led by Charles de Gaulle when the joint American-British-Canadian coalition launched the liberation of France with the invasions of Normandy in June 1944, and of Provence in southern France in August 1944 (47).
The French had been defeated once before by Blitzkrieg or lightning war methods by Germany during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 (Franco-Prussian War). At the outset of the war, 462,000 German conscripts concentrated flawlessly on the French frontier while only 270,000 French volunteers could be moved to face them, the French having lost 100,000 stragglers before a shot was fired through poor planning and administration (48). This was partly due to the peacetime organisations of the armies. Each Prussian Corps was based within a Kreis (literally "circle") around the chief city in an area (49). Reservists rarely lived more than a day's travel from their regiment's depot (50). By contrast, French regiments generally served far from their depots, which in turn were not in the areas of France from which their soldiers were drawn. Reservists often faced several days' journey to reach their depots, and then another long journey to join their regiments (51). Large numbers of reservists choked railway stations, vainly seeking rations and orders. The effect of these differences was accentuated by the pre-war preparations (52). The Prussian General Staff had drawn up minutely detailed mobilization plans using the railway system, which in turn had been partly laid out in response to recommendations of a Railway Section within the General Staff (53). The French railway system, with multiple competing companies, had developed purely from commercial pressures and many journeys to the front in Alsace and Lorraine involved long diversions and frequent changes between trains (54). Furthermore, no system had been put in place for military control of the railways, and officers simply commandeered trains as they saw fit. Sidling and marshalling yards became choked with loaded wagons, with nobody responsible for unloading them or directing them to the correct destination (55).
During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 the French possessed an early machine-gun type weapon, the mitrailleuse, which could fire its 25 barrels at a range of around 2000 yards or 1800 metres (56). It was developed in such secrecy, however, that no real training was effected, and French gunners had no practical experience using it in combat. It was therefore treated like a piece of artillery, and in this role it was ineffective. The barrel of the mitrailleuse could be moved back and forth, with a rotating handle for sweeping fire. The angle was narrow, however, and the barrel could not swing far enough from side to side to produce effective sweeping fire at short distances. Only 210 Reffye mitrailleuses were in existence at the beginning of the war in 1870 (Mitrailleuse). Their field use was discontinued by the French Army after 1871. The French were equipped with bronze, rifled muzzle-loading artillery, while the Prussians used new steel breech-loading guns. The breech-loaders had a far longer range than the muzzle-loading guns, and could be fired faster (57). The famous Krupp 4-pounder steel breech-loading cannons possessed by the Prussians fired a contact-detonated shell filled with zinc balls and explosives, had a range of 4,500 metres (14,800 feet) and blistering rate of fire compared to the French muzzle loading cannons (Franco-Prussian War). The Krupp C/64 field gun, capable of firing an 8 cm caliber, 4 pound projectile, was one of the main artillery pieces of the Germans in the 1870-1871 war with France. It was superior to the French artillery in every way: accuracy, rate of fire and range (58).
The French military during the 1600's were usually successfull in the wars it participated in, although its record for the 1700's was mixed. During the 1700's the French military saw victory in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), the wars of the Polish (1733-1738) and Austrian Succession (1740-1748), victory in its intervention on behalf of the American colonists in their war of independence from Great Britain (1775-1783), and victory in the French Revolutionary wars (1792-1799). It saw defeat however in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) (although it was victorious in the early and latter stages of the war), and in the Seven Years War (1756-1763). In the Seven Years War the French scored some victories and suffered some defeats in continental Europe, and were victorious in the early stages of the war in North America (1754-1763). However, the French colonists in North America were heavily outnumbered in the 1750's, with some 75,000 French colonists ranged against 1.5 million British colonists (59). British naval superiority meant that the United Kingdom could transport more of its troops to North America while the French were tied down in Europe fighting various kingdoms and nations. France scored its greatest military victories under the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte I from November 9 1799 to April 11 1814, and again during his rule of France from March 20 - June 18, 1815. Napoleon managed to defeat and occupy the powerful German states of Austria (Vienna) and Prussia (Berlin). His disastrous Russian campaign of 1812 proved to be his undoing. Napoleon said that he was defeated in Russia by "Generals distance, snow, and mud." From 1941-1944, Nazi Germany suffered the same fate in Russia, which at the time was called the Soviet Union. "Of the 600,000 troops who marched into Russia under Napoleon's leadership, over 500,000 were killed, were captured, deserted, or died of disease and cold" (60). "After 1812, Napoleon had nothing left but an army of old men and teenagers" with which to face the might of the Russian Empire, the German kingdoms of Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria-Hungary, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom (61). The experienced "veterans of Napoleon's past victories" had largely been lost in the Russian invasion (62). At the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the British-led forces, which included Germans, Dutch and Belgians as well as Britons, helped by the arrival of Prussian reinforcements at a crucial stage of the battle, inflicted the decisive defeat of Napoleonic France (63). At the battle, the French had 72,000 troops to battle against 118,000 Allied soldiers, with the British-led forces situated in a defensive position on top of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge (Battle of Waterloo) (64). The British-led forces shielded themselves from the French artillery barrage by hiding behind the reverse slope of the ridge, a tactic which they had often used before when fighting the French in Spain and Portugal from 1808-1814 (65). The Americans, in order to try to seize the Spanish American colonies of Florida and Texas at a time when the Spaniards were allied with Great Britain against Napoleon, fought a war against Great Britain in North America from 1812-1815, with many of the battles occurring in British ruled Canada.
"Many historians trace the beginning of modern fascism to Napoleon I, who ruled France as a dictator during the early 1800's" (66). "Napoleon carried out many liberal reforms and was not a true fascist"(67), although he did crush those French revolutionaries who favoured communism, known as the enragés led by François-Noël Babeuf in 1796 (68). "Fascists of the twentieth century adopted many of Napoleon's methods and ideals. Napoleon promised his people that he would restore the glory of France through military conquest. To prevent opposition, he established one of the first secret police systems. Napoleon also controlled the French press and used propaganda and strict censorship to win support of his programs" (69). Napoleon was born an ethnic Italian from Corsica in 1769, which had been acquired by France from the Italian city-state of Genoa, capital of the Ligurian province of Italy, in 1768. Napoleon began his political career as a Jacobin during the French Revolution, which begain in 1789 when the French military turned against its king. Benito Mussolini began his political career as an anarcho-syndicalist socialist, and the offical name of the fascist Nazi Party in Germany was the Nati(onalosozialistche) Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, which in English translates to the National Socialist German Workers' Party. One of the features of fascism is its hostility to communism and its ultra-nationalism, militarism, and where possible imperial expansionism. A fascist government resembles communism in that its government is a one-party state dictatorship, where a party leader with great popular appeal becomes the leader of the government, assisted by a committee of party members, many of whom are members of the nation's military (70). "But unlike communism, which calls for the government to own most if not all of industry, fascism allows industry to remain in private ownership, though under government control" (71). "A fascist government forbids strikes so that production will not be interrupted, as does communism. Fascism outlaws labor unions and replaces them with a network of organizations in the major industries. These organizations, which consist of both workers and employers, are called corporations, but they differ from those in other countries. Fascist corporations supposedly represent both labor and management but actually are controlled by the government. Through the corporations, the government determines wages, hours, and production goals. As a result, a fascist country is sometimes called a corporative state. A fascist government permits and even encourages private enterprise-as long as such activity serves the government's goals. However, the government maintains strict control of industry to make sure it produces what the nation needs. The government discourages imports by putting high tariffs on certain essential products or by banning imports of those products. It does not want to depend on other countries for such vital products as oil and steel" (72). Nazi Germany tried to gain self-sufficiency in oil by making oil artificially from its coal reserves (73). During The Second World War the Nazis tried to seize the Soviet oil fields around the Caspian Sea as well as the oil fields of Romania, and the Nazis had a plan to seize the oil fields of the Middle East in a pincer attack, with one attack coming from the north from the Soviet Union, and another attack coming from the west from North Africa (74). The Nazi desire for economic self-sufficiency was known as autarky. "The fascist desire for national glory leads to an increase in military spirit and a build-up of the armed forces. After the military forces become strong enough, they may invade and occupy other countries" (75). However, in an age of nuclear weapons, such expansionary fascist policies would be mutually destructive to both attacker and defender in terms of unpredictable nuclear fallout. Such a policy of nuclear deterrence is known as MAD or mutually assured destruction.
"The British troops during the Napoleonic Wars were trained to a high level, and its rank and file in contrast to the other European armies at the time were volunteers. In contrast the French army were mainly conscripts and hastily trained. Unlike the British trooper who received a minimum of 6 month's training most French troops received after 1805 a bare 2 to 3 weeks, being lucky if they were taught basic horsemanship and drill. France was not separated by water from her enemies as were the British on their island and was forced to have massive land armies and have it quick. War followed war with little time in between for training. In contrast the British could simply embark their troops on navy ships and leave, and this is what they did so many times. Britain during the Napoleonic Wars was the wealthiest country in the world with a relatively small army, and it could afford a high ratio of practice rounds per soldier in live fire musketry training" (British Army of the Napoleonic Wars 1805-1815 in Google Search). In the aftermath of the American War of Independence (1775-1783), during which the British infantry had fought in looser formations than previously, rigid close-order linear formations had been reintroduced by General Sir David Dundas. His 1792 manual became the standard drill book for the infantry. As the French Revolutionary (1792-1799) then Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) progressed British line infantry tactics were developed to allow more flexibility for command and control, placing more reliance upon the officers on the spot for quick reactions (British Army during the Napoleonic Wars). The line formation was the most favoured, as it offered the maximum firepower, about 1000 to 1500 bullets per minute (76). Though the manual laid down that lines were to be formed in three ranks, the lines were often formed only two ranks deep, especially in Spain and Portugal (77). While the French favoured the 9 rows deep column formation, the line formation enabled all muskets available to fire at the enemy. In contrast, only the few soldiers in the first rows of the column (about 60) were able to fire (78). British infantry were far better trained in musketry than most armies on the European continent (30 rounds per man in training, compared with only 10 in the Austrian Army) and their volleys were notably steady and effective (79). Disciplined, short-range musket volleys, followed by a bayonet charge, usually drove off an attacker (80). At the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 the French abandoned their column formations, with each French division advancing in closely spaced battalion lines behind one another in order to concentrate their fire, but their new tactical arrangements did not leave them room to change formation (81).
During the Middle Ages the French took the usual lead in the Crusades to the Middle East, and they formed the ruling class of the Levant crusader states which lasted from 1099 to 1291 A.D. The Levant is the Mediterranean coastal regions of the modern-day states of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. During the on-again, off-again Hundred Years War fought between Anglo-Norman England and France from 1337-1453, a war which the French eventually won, the English and Welsh longbowmen sometimes defeated the French, who relied on mercenary crossbowmen. The longbow's accuracy was as good as that of the crossbow, had a longer range, and could be fired at a faster rate than the crossbow, being able to fire at most 6 arrows per minute while the crossbow could fire at most 2 bolts a minute (82). The crossbow however had a greater penetrating strength. Although knights in steel plate armour could withstand the impact of the longbow arrow, many knights and nearly all footsoldiers could not afford this expensive protection, and had to rely on a coat of interlaced metal called mail which covered a long garment of padded fabric or leather, or plate armour made of wrought iron, which could be penetrated by a longbow fired arrow. Knights were vulnerable in their limbs to longbow fired arrows, because steel plate armour which covered the limbs was thinner in thickness than that which protected the trunk of the body (English Longbow) (83). Horses were usually vulnerable to longbow arrows. Knights in plate armour were so heavy that they had to be lifted onto a horse by a crane. If they fell off during battle or their horse was shot and felled by arrows, they could not get up without help, and often lay at the mercy of the enemy (84). The Norman French conquerors of England adopted the longbow in their wars against the Welsh and Scottish longbowmen, requiring their English tenant farmers or serfs of yeoman status to practice longbow archery for war (85). The yeomen were tenant farmers of middle class or middling status who could afford to hire the labour of poorer serfs. The Normans had to be careful not to burden their tenant farmers too hard for fear of pushing them into open rebellion, and it was for this reason that the continental Europeans did not arm their serfs with the longbow, although in a set-piece battle the longbowmen required the protection of knights and pikemen from counterattack, and knights had castles and hillforts to withstand a siege (86). The longbow was phased out of England during the 1500's by firearms, which required a shorter period of training with and had a greater penetrating force than the crossbow, which in turn had a greater penetrating force than the longbow (English Longbow). With the arrival of firearms, the European nobility had to be extra careful not to push their tenant farmers and the poorer inhabitants of urban areas into rebellion. With firearms wars became more democratic, although as Napoleonic France, Communist Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany showed, a new kind of totalitarian dictatorship was possible with conscript armies.
The bravest and most fanatical soldiers of The Second World War were the Japanese, who were motivated by the samurai code of bushido, a stringent code of chivalry, and State Shinto, which regarded the Emperor of Japan as divine. To die for the Emperor in battle was regarded as a way of getting into heaven. Bushido taught the Japanese soldiers to fight to the death when attacked, or if too wounded to fight on, then commmit suicide or hara-kiri (i.e. seppuku). The old Japanese samurai martial arts of jujitsu, from which judo came, and kendo were taught to the Japanese soldier, as well as karate (87). The martial arts are still a part of Japanese military training to this day. The Japanese made judo a compulsory subject for males in their schools after 1909, although this requirement was outlawed by the Americans from 1945-1951. The martial arts stressed the principle of mind over matter (88). This principle was best exemplified in the martial art of bayonet fighting known as jukendo, which was used in the banzai charge when low on ammunition and food, or when surrounded, cut-off, cornered, outnumbered, and outgunned by the Allies, and also by the suicidal kamikaze attacks of Japanese fighter pilots. The Japanese in the first six months after their attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 swept all before them, conquering the American, British, French, Dutch, and Portugese colonial forces in South-East Asia. After June 1942 they were gradually pushed back by superior American, British, and Australian firepower and numbers. The British forces in India were lucky to have the support of most of the Indian troops in their colonial army, since the British promised India independence as soon as possible after the end of the war, which was fulfilled in 1947. Nevertheless the Japanese did try to conquer eastern India by launching an attack from neighbouring Burma in the Imphal-Kohima campaign of March-June 1944. Burma had been conquered from the British colonial forces in 1942 by the Japanese, as had Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong in the same year. In this campaign they were assisted by some collaborating Indians led by Subhas Chandra Bose. The Asians had initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators from European colonial rule, but as with the Nazi Germans in the Soviet Union, their brutal and harsh rule soon saw the Asians take up arms as guerrilla resistance fighters against the Japanese occupation (89). The Japanese brutality in China (1931/1937-1945) saw them bogged down in an stalemated guerrilla war with the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong, and the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek. Some of the Chinese Nationalists led by Wang Ching-Wei collaborated with the Japanese in order to fight the Communists (90). The closest equivalent the European armies had to the Japanese in fanatical bravery were Hitler's Waffen-SS political soldiers, who were trained in judo, boxing, and wrestling (Martial Arts in World War 2). Under the Nazis, boxing had been made a compulsory subject for males in German schools (Nazis Education) (91). Most of the Waffen-SS believed that Hitler had been sent by divine providence to fight the godless or officially atheist Communists, whom they believed were led by the Jews. A disproportionate minority of Jews were members of the Russian Communist revolutionaries of 1917, although many of them were later persecuted by Joseph Stalin when he ruled the Soviet Union as dictator from 1929-1953 (92). The reason why the Jews formed such a disproportionate minority of Russian Communists was because they had been persecuted by the Russian Emperors or Tsars, and occasionally massacred under their rule in campaigns known as pogroms (93). Communism, at least officially, preached ethnic tolerance and the international solidarity of all workers, even if it did not always follow this in practice. See Jewish Bolshevism. The Nazis also believed that the Jews controlled international finance and moneylending, and in particular the New York and London stock exchanges. The reason why a disproportionate minority of Jews were moneylenders and merchants was because they were forbidden from most professions, trades, and landlorships in the Middle Ages, for a Jew was never allowed to be the master of a Christian, or a Muslim (Christianity and antisemitism and see References to Jews in the Koran in Jewish Virtual Library, and Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries, in Jewish Virtual Library, Updated September 2011). Palestine or Canaan in the ancient world lay on an important intersection of trade or caravan routes of the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East, linking the ancient civilizations of Egypt and Kush with Phoenicia, Assyria, Babylonia, Sumeria, and Persia. The Fertile Crescent of the Middle East comprised the valleys of the Nile, Jordan, Litani, Orontes, Euphrates, and Tigris rivers, as well as the originally forested mountains, hills, and coastal plains of the Levant. The Levant today consists of the modern nations of Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and the parts of these nations which face the Mediterranean Sea have subtropical dry climates with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers, and are covered with such trees as Cedars of Lebanon and Cypresses on the uncleared parts of hills and mountains. See Via Maris (The Way of the Sea), The Ancient King's Highway, and The Fertile Crescent.
(1). Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim, with an introduction by D.C. Watt, Pimlico, Great Britain. 2007 Reprint, pages 120 and 135.
(2). Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, Orlando, Florida, U.S.A., Second Edition, Updated Printing, 1991, pages 91 and 109-110.
(3). Ibid, pages 172, 198-199.
(4). Ibid, pages 415-416, 419.
(5). Ibid, pages 344, 420.
(6). Ibid, pages 340-342.
(7). Ibid, pages 204, 26, 105, 146.
(8). Ibid, pages 204, 26, 105, 146 and David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, 1966, Reprinted in Penguin Books 1990, London, United Kingdom, pages 352-353, 591.
(9). Robert O. Paxton, pages 359-362, 420.
(10). Eddy Bauer, (2000)  Peter Young, editor, The History of World War II. (revised edition) London: Orbis, page 95; Philip S. Jowett (2001), The Italian Army 1940-1945: Africa 1940-1943, Men-at-Arms, page 11; John Bierman and Colin Smith (2003) , War Without Hate: The Desert Campaign of 1940-1943, New York: Penguin, pages 13-14; Ian W. Walker (2003), Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa, Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, page 199.
(11). Jonathan Steinberg (1990), All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941-1943, Routledge, pages 189, 191; Eddy Bauer, page 231; Ian W. Walker, pages 12 and 26.
(12). Ian W. Walker, pages 11 and 20 and Eddy Bauer, pages 90-95.
(13). Ian W. Walker, page 23.
(14). Luciano Garibaldi (2001), Century of War, Friedman/Fairfax Publishers, New York, page 151, and Eddy Bauer, pages 96 and 493.
(15). K.P. Pankhurst (1968) Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935, Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press, pages 555-557; Siegbert Herausgegeben von Uhlig, Encyclopedia Aethiopica: A-C Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2003, page 108.
(16). Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (Penguin Books, 1999).
(17). Robert O. Paxton, pages 403-406, 419-422.
(18). Robert O. Paxton, pages 446-447.
(19). Ibid, pages 450-451.
(20). Bernhard Chiari (2011), "Die abgewendete Katastrophe", Damals (in German) 43 (6): pages 32-37.
(21). Robert O. Paxton, pages 456 and 461.
(22). Ibid, pages 106-108, 127-128.
(23). Ibid, pages 344-348.
(24). Ibid, pages 599 and 642.
(25). William G. Dewald, "Capitalism", page 157, The World Book Encyclopedia, Volume C-ch, No.3, 1987, Chicago, U.S.A.
(26). History of the Twentieth Century, Purnell-BPC Publishing, 1969.
(27). H.E. Salisbury, The 900 Days: the Siege of Leningrad, Macmillan, 1969.
(28). History of the Twentieth Century, Purnell-BPC Publishing, 1969.
(29). Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930-1949, London: Pen and Sword, 2003, First Edition 1961, page 80.
(30). Robert O. Paxton, pages 453-454.
(31). Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London: Aurum Press, 2000, page 305.
(32). Robert O. Paxton, pages 446-447, 450; Ian Dear and M. Foot, The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford, Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press, 2001, page 316.
(33). Ibid, pages 450-451.
(34). Ibid, pages 449-451.
(35). Ibid, page 450, and Mark Healy, editor, John and Prigent, Panzerwaffe: The Campaigns in the West 1940. Volume 1, London. Ian Allan Publishing, 2008, page 23.
(36). Mark Healy, page 23; Ian Dear and M. Foot, page 316
(37). Mark Healy, page 23.
(38). James Corum. "The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform". Modern War Studies: Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992, page 204.
(39). Robert O. Paxton, p.174.
(40). Edward M. Coffman, "World War I", The World Book Encyclopedia, Volume W.X.Y.Z., No.21, Chicago, U.S.A. 1987, page 373.
(41). Hew Strachan. The First World War. New York: Viking, 2003, page 246.
(42). Edward M. Coffman, page 373.
(43). Hew Strachan, page 247.
(45). Edward M. Coffman, page 373.
(46). Robert O. Paxton, pages 87-88.
(47). Ibid, page 464.
(48). William McElwee (1974). The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. page 46.
(49). Michael Howard (1991) The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870-1871. New York: Routledge. page 68.
(52). Ibid, pages 70-71.
(56). Ibid, pages 35-36.
(57). Michael Howard, pages 35-36.
(58). Michael Solka and Darko Pavlovich (2004). German Armies 1870-71 (1): Prussia. Osprey Publishing, pages 753-754.
(59). John Powell (2005). Encyclopedia of North American Immigration. New York: Facts on File, page 204; Francis D. Cogliano (2008) Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A Political History. London: Routledge, page 32.
(60). Vernon J. Puryear. "Napoleon I". The World Book Encyclopedia, Chicago, U.S.A., 1987, Volume N.O, No. 14, page 16.
(63). Peter Hofschröer (1999), 1815: The Waterloo Campaign. The German Victory 2, London: Greenhill Books, page 125.
(64). Peter Hofschröer, pages 72-73; Alessandro Barbero (2005), The Battle: A New History of Waterloo, Atlantic Books, pages 75-76; Charles C. Chesney (1907), Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815, Longman, Green, and Co. page 4.
(65). Alessandro Barbero, pages 78-79, and Robin Neillands, Wellington and Napoleon: Clash of Arms 1807-1815, 2003, Pen and Sword Books Limited, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, England, passim.
(66). Michael Hurst, "Fascism", The World Book Encyclopedia, Chicago, U.S.A., 1987, Volume F, No.7, page 51.
(68). David Thomson, pages 45-46.
(69). Michael Hurst, page 51.
(71). Ibid, page 50.
(72). Ibid, page 51.
(73). Robert O. Paxton, pages 342 and 424.
(74). John Pimlott, Foreword by Allan Bullock, The Viking Atlas of World War II, Penguin Group, Middlesex, England, 1995, pages 72-73, 114-115.
(75). Michael Hurst, page 51.
(76). Philip J. Haythornthwaite (1996). Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars: Arms and Armour, page 26.
(77). Ibid, page 5.
(78). Ibid, page 5.
(79). Michael Chappell (2004), Wellington's Peninsula Regiments (2): The Light Infantry, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, page 14.
(80). Ibid and Robin Neillands, passim.
(81). Alessandro Barbero, page 165.
(82). Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy (2005), The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose, Sutton Publishing, page 31.
(83). Ibid, pages 272-278.
(84). I.J. Sanders, "Knights and Knighthood", The World Book Encyclopedia, Volume J.K, No.11, Chicago, U.S.A., 1987, page 276.
(85). Daniel Waley, Later Medieval Europe: from St. Louis to Luther, Second Edition, Longman, London and New York, 1985, Seventh Impression 1995, pages 118-119 and 127; Earl Roger Kruschke (1985), The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: a Continuing American Dilemma. C.C. Thomas Publishing Co., page 31.
(86). Stanislaw Andrzejewski (2003) (1954). Military Organization and Society, page 65 and G.M. Trevelyan (2008), English Social History - A Survey of Six Centuries - Chaucer to Queen Victoria. READ BOOK, page 18.
(87). Leo J. Daugherty III, Fighting Techniques of a Japanese Infantryman 1941-1945: Training, Techniques and Weapons. MBI Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A., 2002, pages 14 and 22.
(88). Ibid, pages 14 and 29-30.
(89). Edwin P. Hoyt, The Great Pacific Conflict: Japan's War: 1853 to 1952, Da Capo Press paperback, New York, pages 255-256, 260, 263, 269, 366, 388.
(90). Ibid, passim.
(91). Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim, with an introduction by D.C. Watt, pages 373 and 497, 2007 Reprint.
(92). Sergey Kara-Murza, "Revolutionary (Socialist) Political Forces between February and October (1917)". Soviet Civilization. Volume 1; Jeffrey Herf (2008), The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, page 96; Stefani Hoffman and Ezra Mendelsohn (2008), The Revolution of 1905 and Russia's Jews. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, page 178,
(93). Berel Wein (1976). Triumph of Survival: The Jews in the Modern Era: 1600-1990. Brooklyn: Mesorah.
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